The notion of resettable zero-knowledge (rZK) was introduced by Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali (FOCS'01) as a strengthening of the classical notion of zero-knowledge. A rZK protocol remains zero-knowledge even if the verifier can reset the prover back to its initial state anytime during the protocol execution and force it to use the same random tape again and again. Following this work, various extensions of this notion were considered for the zero-knowledge and witness indistinguishability functionalities.
Introduction
The notion of resettable zero-knowledge (rZK) was introduced by Canetti et al [CGGM00] with a motivation towards obtaining zero-knowledge protocols for highly adversarial environments. In rZK, the verifier is given the additional power that anytime during the protocol execution, it can "reset" the prover back to its initial state thus restarting the prover with the same configuration and coin tosses. This notion is motivated by several natural questions. Firstly, it address the question: "is zero-knowledge possible when the prover uses the same random coins in more than one execution?" and (surprisingly) gives a positive answer to it. Secondly, it shows that zero-knowledge protocols can be securely implemented by devices which can neither reliably keep state nor toss coins online. An example of such a device might be a resettable stateless "smartcard" with secure hardware (which can be reset, e.g., by switching off its power) [CGGM00] . Thus, rZK can be viewed as "zero-knowledge protocols for stateless devices". Canetti et al [CGGM00] provide rZK proof system (for NP) with non-constant number of rounds and resettable witness indistinguishable (rWI) proof system with a constant number of rounds.
Canetti et al [CGGM00] observed that since the prover can be reset, an adversarial verifier can actually achieve the effect of interacting with the prover concurrently in several sessions, thus in particular implying concurrent zero knowledge [DNS98] . In more detail, the verifier can start a session with the prover and while the interaction is still in progress, can reset the prover to start another interaction. It could reset the prover again in the middle to that interaction and come back to the previous interaction by just running the protocol identically up to the point where it reset the prover before. Thus, the verifier gets the flexibility of choosing its messages in one interaction based on the messages of the prover in some other interaction. In other words, the verifier can essentially interact with the prover in various sessions and can interleave these sessions as it pleases. Thus, a rZK protocol is a concurrent ZK protocol as well [CGGM00] . Following this work, research on improving the round complexity of concurrent ZK also led to rZK with improved round complexity [KP01, PRS02] .
Subsequent to the introduction of this notion, various extensions were considered. Barak, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Lindell [BGGL01] studied resettably-sound ZK (rsZK) where it is the verifier that can be reset by the prover. The main challenge is to design a ZK protocol which retains its soundness even when verifier uses the same random coins in multiple executions. Relying the non black-box techniques of Barak [Bar01] , Barak et al were able to construct constant round rsZK arguments. These rsZK arguments were also used to construct resettable zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge [BGGL01] . An open question raised by [BGGL01] is: do there exist ZK protocols where both the prover and the verifier are resettable by each other? While this still remains an open problem, partial progress was made in [DL07] . The notion of resettability was also studied extensively in the bare public key model introduced by [CGGM00] with a goal of obtaining more efficient protocols (see [YZ07] and the references therein).
Going Beyond ZK -Our Contributions. Common to all the prior work on the notion of resettability is that they consider only the zero-knowledge (or closely related) functionality. This raises the following natural question:
"Do there exist other classes of functionalities for which resettably secure protocols can be obtained?"
In other words, do there exist protocols for other tasks such that the "security" is retained even if one of parties participating in the protocol can be reset by the other one? We initiate the study of general resettable computation and answer the above question in the affirmative.
-Resettable Two-Party Computation. In fact, we prove a general completeness theorem for resettable computation showing that it is possible to construct a protocol to securely realize any PPT computable functionality. Our results are for the setting where one party (called the user) can reset the other party (called the smartcard) during the protocol execution. We first formalize this notion of resettable two-party computation and give a natural simulation based security definition for it. We then construct a general two-party computation protocol under standard (polynomial time) cryptographic assumption. We in fact give a "resettability compiler" which can compile any semi-honest secure (in the standalone setting) protocol into one that is resettably secure. The simulator for our resettable two-party computation protocol makes use of non-black box techniques. We note that non-black box simulation is inherent since Barak et al [BGGL01] show that it is impossible to obtain rsZK arguments (for languages outside BPP) using black-box simulation and rsZK arguments for NP is only a special case of a two-party functionality.
-Resettable Multi-Party Computation. Given the above results, two natural questions that arise then are: (a) Do there exists general secure resettable multi-party computation protocols (where one or more of the parties are resettable)?, and, (b) Can the construction be extended to handle cases where both parties can potentially reset each other? Towards that end, we first observe that the our construction for resettable two-party computation can be extended using standard techniques to show the existence of resettable multi-party computation (where only one of the parties can be reset) with dishonest majority. Next, we offer a construction of simultaneous resettable multi-party computation (where all the parties are resettable) assuming a majority of the parties behave honestly. That is, the adversary not only controls a minority of parties but is also allowed to reset any number of honest parties at any point in the protocol execution. At the core of our construction is a new construction of families of multi-party 1-round (and thus automatically resettable) zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge which are simulation sound [Sah99] .
Our results show that in cryptographic protocols, the reliance on randomness and the ability to keep state can be made significantly weaker. We in fact show a simple transformation from any resettably secure protocol (as per our definitions) to a fully stateless one. By this we mean that the party which was resettable in the original protocol need not maintain any state at all in the transformed protocol.
Concurrency vs Resettability.
As discussed earlier, if a party can be reset, the other party can actually achieve the effect of interacting with it concurrently in several sessions. This fact is the reason for the folklore that a resettably secure protocol should also be concurrently secure (i.e., concurrently self-composable). However far reaching impossibility results have been proven showing that a large class of functionalities cannot be securely realized [Lin03, Lin04] (even in the fixed roles setting) in the plain model. This stands in sharp contrast to our general positive results for resettable two-party computation.
In resettable two-party computation, an adversarial user already has the power to reset the smartcard and interact with it as many times as it likes. This fact that the number of interactions cannot be controlled is precisely what makes resettable two-party computation possible. In the formulation of our ideal model for defining security, we give the adversarial user the power to interact with the smartcard as many times it likes. Given that an adversarial user is allowed to reset the smartcard in the real model (thus creating new problems), emulating the view of such an adversary in the ideal world is only possible if several interactions with the smartcard are allowed. In other words, we are only allowing the user to do in the ideal world what he is already allowed to do in reality. By giving our ideal adversary such extra power, we are able to construct protocols satisfying our definition in the plain model. In our construction, the number of times the simulator sends the reset request in the ideal world is polynomially related to the number of times the real world adversary sends the reset request. An open problem raised by the current work is to design a construction having a precise simulation [MP06] with respect to the number of outputs.
Combining our results with the impossibility results of Lindell [Lin03, Lin04] , we get a first separation between the notions of resetability and concurrency. That is, a resettably secure protocol (as per our definitions) is not always a concurrently secure protocol (even for fixed roles) and vice versa (this direction is implicit in [CGGM00] ). In fact there exists a large class of functionalities for which concurrently selfcomposable protocols do not exist but resettably secure protocols do (as we show that they exist for every two-party functionality).
Stateless vs Stateful Devices. Our results have interesting implications about the power of stateless devices. Consider a stateless device (holding an input, possibly unable to toss coins online) trying to run a protocol for secure computation of some functionality with a user. Our results show that stateless devices can run secure computation protocols for every task. Of course, stateless devices can only be used when one does not want to limit the number of protocol executions that the device carries out (with a particular input).
What if one does want to limit the number of interactions that the device carries out? We remark that it is also possible to obtain the following "best of both worlds" protocol in such a case. In case the adversary is not able to reset the device during the protocol interaction, the protocol provides a traditional security guarantee (i.e., security as per the ideal/real world simulation paradigm, see Canetti [Can00] ). However if it turns out that the adversary was successfully able to reset the device, the maximum the adversary can do is to achieve the effect of running the protocol several times with the device (possibly choosing different input each time).
While "protocols for stateless devices" are naturally useful for weak and inexpensive devices (e.g., smartcard), other applications of such protocols could include making a powerful server (providing services to many clients) stateless to prevent denial of service attacks.
Universally Composable Multi-Party Computation using Tamper Proof Hardware. To show one example of the power of our results, we consider the recent work on obtaining universally composable multi-party computation using tamper proof hardware tokens [Kat] . As noted before, broad impossibility results have been proven showing that a large class of functionalities cannot be UC securely realized in the plain model [CF01, CKL06] . These severe impossibility results motivated the study of other models involving some sort of trusted setup assumptions (assuming a trusted third party), where general positive results can be obtained. To avoid these trust assumptions (while still maintaining feasibility of protocols), Katz recently proposed using a physical setup. In his model, the physical setup phase includes the parties exchanging tamper proof hardware tokens implementing some functionality.
The security of the construction in [Kat] relies on the ability of the tamper-resistant hardware to maintain state (even when, for example, the power supply is cut off). In particular, the parties need to execute a four-round coin flipping protocol with the tamper-resistant hardware. Using our techniques, one can immediately relax this requirement and make the token completely stateless. In particular, we can apply our compiler to the coin flipping protocol in [Kat] and obtain a new construction where the token, when fed with an input x, only outputs f (x) for a fixed f and halts. A construction having such a property was first obtained recently by Chandran et al [CGS08] by relying on techniques that are very specific to the setting of UC secure computation with tamper proof hardware. However our construction has an added advantage that a possibly adversarial token does not learn any information about the input of the honest party using it (and hence the security is retained even when the adversarial creator of the token "recaptures" it at a later point of time). This is leads to the first construction of UC secure computation with stateless and recapturable tokens. On the downside, as opposed to [CGS08] , the security of this construction would rely on the adversary "knowing" the code of the tokens which it distributes to the honest parties (see [CGS08] for more details).
Open Problems. The main question left open by the current work is: "Do there exist two-party and multi-party computation protocols in the dishonest majority setting where more than one party is resettable?". Eventually, one would like to construct simultaneous resettable multi-party computation where the adversary can control any number of parties and can reset any number of honest parties at any point (or show that such protocols cannot exist). The first step to make any progress towards answering the above questions is proving or disproving the existence of a simultaneous resettable zero-knowledge argument (first mentioned as an open problem in the work of Barak et al [BGGL01] ).
The Resettable Ideal Model

Resettable Two-Party Computation
Informally speaking, our model for resettable two-party computation is as follows. We consider a smartcard S holding several inputs x 1 1 , . . . , x num 1 and random tapes ω 1 1 , . . . , ω num
1
. We denote by X 1 the full input and randomness vector (i.e., the concatenation of all the inputs and random tapes) held by S. The ith incarnation of the smartcard S is a deterministic strategy defined by the pair (x i 1 , ω i 1 ) as in [CGGM00] . We stress that while each incarnation has its own random tape, as in [CGGM00] , when a particular incarnation is reset, it starts over with the same random tape. Thus, we model different smartcards as the different incarnations. We consider a user U holding an input x 2 interested in interacting with the ith incarnation of the smartcard S. The user activates the ith incarnation of the smartcard and runs a protocol with it to securely compute a function f (., .). We do not explicitly define a way of activating the ith incarnation; it could either be through physical means or by sending an initial message to S specifying the incarnation U would like to interact with. At any point during the protocol execution, the user U can reset the smartcard S to its initial state, thus, having a chance to start interaction again with any incarnation with a fresh input. At the end of the protocol, both the parties get the output f (x 1 , x 2 ), x 1 = x i 1 where i and x 2 are the incarnation and the inputs which were most recently selected by the user U. We remark that we only consider one side resettability, that is, the smartcard S is not allowed to reset the user U.
To formalize the above requirement and define security, we extend the standard paradigm for defining secure computation. We define an ideal model of computation and a real model of computation, and require that any adversary in the real model can be emulated (in the specific sense described below) by an adversary in the ideal model. In a given execution of the protocol we assume that all inputs have length κ, the security parameter. We consider a static adversary which chooses whom to corrupt before execution of the protocol. In our model, both the parties get the same output (the case where parties should get different outputs can be easily handled using standard techniques). Finally, we consider computational security only and therefore restrict our attention to adversaries running in probabilistic polynomial time.
Ideal model. In the ideal model there is a trusted party which computes the desired functionality based on the inputs handed to it by the players. Then an execution in the ideal model proceeds as follows:
Select incarnation The user U sends an incarnation index i to the trusted party which then passes it on to the smartcard S.
Inputs The smartcard S has input x 1 while the user U has input x 2 .
Send inputs to trusted party Both S and U send their inputs to the trusted party. An honest party always sends its real inputs to the trusted party. A corrupted party, on the other hand, may decide to send modified value to the trusted party.
Trusted party computes the result The trusted party sets the result to be f (x 1 , x 2 ). It generates and uses uniform random coin if required for the computation of f .
Trusted party sends results to adversary The trusted party sends the result f (x 1 , x 2 ) to either S or U depending upon whoever is the adversary.
Trusted party sends results to honest players The adversary, depending on its view up to this point, does the following. It either sends the abort signal in which case the trusted party sends ⊥ to the honest party. Or it could signal the trusted party to continue in which case the trusted party sends the result f (x 1 , x 2 ) to the honest party.
Reset ideal world at any point In case the user U is the adversary, during the execution of any of the above steps, it can send the signal reset to the trusted party. In that case, the trusted party sends reset to the smartcard S and the ideal world comes back to the select incarnation stage.
Outputs An honest party always outputs the response it received from the trusted party. The adversary outputs an arbitrary function of its entire view throughout the execution of the protocol.
For a given adversary A, the execution of f in the ideal model on X 1 , x 2 is defined as the output of the honest parties along with the output of the adversary resulting from the process above. It is denoted by ideal f,A (X 1 , x 2 ).
Real model. An honest party follows all instructions of the prescribed protocol, while a adversarial party may behave arbitrarily. If the user U is the adversarial party, it can reset the smartcard S at any point during the protocol execution. After getting reset, S comes back to its original state which it was in when starting the protocol execution thus allowing U to choose a fresh input and start interaction again with any incarnation of the smartcard S. At the conclusion of the protocol, an honest party computes its output as prescribed by the protocol. Without loss of generality, we assume the adversary outputs exactly its entire view of the execution of the protocol.
For a given adversary B and protocol Σ for resettably computing f , the execution of Σ in the real model on X 1 , x 2 (denoted real Σ,B (X 1 , x 2 )) is defined as the output of the honest parties along with the output of the adversary resulting from the above process.
Having defined these models, we now define what is meant by a resettable two-party computation protocol. By probabilistic polynomial time (ppt), we mean a probabilistic Turing machine with nonuniform advice whose running time is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter κ. By expected probabilistic polynomial time (eppt), we mean a Turing machine whose expected running time is bounded by some polynomial, for all inputs.
Definition 1 Let f and Σ be as above. Protocol Σ is a secure protocol for computing f if for every ppt adversary A corrupting either of the two players in the real model, there exists an eppt adversary S corrupting that player in the ideal model, such that:
Our real model translates to the so called multiple incarnation non-interleaving setting in the terminology of [CGGM00] . This setting was shown to be equivalent to the multiple incarnation interleaving setting for the case of zero-knowledge and their proof can be extended to the general case as well. In other words, a protocol Σ which is secure when the user U is allowed only to interact with one incarnation at a time remain secure even if U is allowed to concurrently interact with any number of incarnation simultaneously. For simplicity of exposition, we only consider the setting when the inputs of smartcard S are all fixed in advance (while S is acting as honest party in the protocol). However we remark that our protocols also work for the more general case when the inputs of S are adaptively chosen possibly based on the outputs in the previous protocol executions. More details regarding these issues will be provided in the full version.
Simultaneous Resettable Multi-Party Computation
For lack of space, we provide the model for this case in Appendix B. The main changes from the twoparty case is that we consider an adversary who controls a minority of the parties and can reset any number of honest parties at any point during the protocol.
Extensions
In this section, we informally describe two extensions which can be applied to our constructions proven secure as per our definitions. More formal details will be provided in the full version.
Going from Resettable to Stateless. Any protocol which is resettably secure can be transformed to a stateless protocol using relatively standard techniques. In other words, the parties which were allowed to be resettable in the original protocol need not maintain any state at all in the transformed protocol. By a stateless device we mean that the device only supports a "request-reply" interaction (i.e., the device just outputs f (x) when fed with x for some fixed f ). We describe the case of two party first assuming both the parties are resettable (the case where one party is resettable is only simpler). Let we have parties P 1 and P 2 participating in the original resettably secure protocol Σ. Now we define a protocol Σ having parties P 1 and P 2 . Each of these parties will have a secret key of a CCA-2 secure encryption scheme and a secret MAC key. The party P 1 computes the first message to be sent in the protocol Σ by running P 1 internally. However it then sends to P 2 not only the computed message but also an encryption of the current state of P 1 and a MAC on it. Party P 2 similarly computes the reply by feeding the received message to P 2 and sends to P 1 not only the computed reply but also (a) the received encrypted state of P 1 and the MAC, and, (b) an encryption of the current state of P 2 and a MAC on it using its own keys. Thus for the next round, P 1 can decrypt, verify and load the received state into P 1 , feed it the incoming reply and then compute the next outgoing message. P 2 can similarly continue with the protocol. The case of multi-party protocols can also be handled by first transforming the given protocol into one where only one party sends a message in any given round and then applying ideas similar to the one for the two party case to this resulting protocol.
Getting the Best of Both Worlds. One might ask the question: is it possible to have a single protocol such that in case the adversary is not able to reset the device, the protocol provides a traditional security guarantee (i.e., security as per the ideal/real world simulation paradigm, see Canetti [Can00] ). However if it turns out that the adversary is successfully able to reset the device, the protocol still provides security as per the resettable ideal model definition presented above. We remark that it is easy to transform both our constructions into ones which provide such a best of both worlds guarantee (however we do not know if our transformation works for all constructions). We build a counter into the device which gets incremented with every protocol execution (whether successfully completed or not). The randomness used by the device for a protocol execution comes from the application of a PRF to the current counter value. This guarantees that in case the device is able to keep such a counter successfully, the randomness used in each execution is fresh and independent of others. Thus, it is easy to show that one can use a significantly simpler simulator (which can only handle standalone executions) to prove security of our constructions in such a setting.
Building Blocks
Our protocols make use of the following building blocks: a commitment scheme COM based on one way permutations, computational zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of knowledge, zaps [DN00] , resettable sound zero-knowledge arguments [BGGL01] and the PRS concurrent zero-knowledge preamble [PRS02] . More details about these building blocks are provided in Appendix A for lack of space.
Resettable Two-Party Computation
The Construction
We now describe how to transform any given two party protocol Π (which is only semi-honest secure) into a resettably secure protocol Σ. Prior to the beginning of the protocol, we assume that the smartcard S and the user U have agreed upon the incarnation of S for the protocol (see Section 2.1). As noted in Section 2.1, each incarnation of the smartcard S has its own independent random tape. We assume that the private inputs to S and U in the protocol Π are x 1 and x 2 respectively. The smartcard S denotes the party which can be reset by the other party U in the protocol Σ. We view the random tape of the smartcard as a tuple (G, R rs ). Here G denotes the description of a function G : {0, 1} ≤poly(κ) → {0, 1} poly(κ) taken from an ensemble of pseudorandom functions and R rs denotes a random string which S will use while acting as a verifier of a resettable sound zero-knowledge argument (see Section A.4 for more details). Let R denote the uniform distribution. The protocol proceeds as follows.
PRS Preamble Phase
1. U → S: Generate r 2 $ ← R and let β = (x 2 , r 2 ). Here r 2 is the randomness to be used (after coin flipping with S) by the user U at various stages of the protocol Σ (including to carry out the protocol Π) as explained later on. We assume that r 2 is of sufficient size to allow U to execute all such stages. Generate random shares
Using the commitment scheme COM, commit to all these shares. Denote these commitments by
. Let msg be the concatenation of all these commitment strings, i.e., msg
We call msg to be the determining message of this session (since it commits the user U to its input and randomness). The random tape used by the smartcard S to carry out rest of the protocol Σ (except when acting as a verifier of a resettable sound ZK argument) will be determined by the application of the pseudorandom function G to the determining message msg. Again, we assume that G(msg) is of sufficient size to allow the execution of all the steps.
U ↔ S:
The user U and the smartcard S will now use a resettable-sound zero-knowledge argument system (rsP, rsV ) (relying a non-black box simulator [BGGL01] ). U emulates the prover rsP and proves the following statement to the resettable verifier rsV (emulated by S): the above PRS commit phase is a valid commit phase (see Appendix A.5). In other words, there exist valuesβ,
can be decommitted to
. The user U uses a fresh (uncommitted) random tape for emulation of the prover rsP . The random tape used by S to emulate the resettable verifier rsV comes from R rs . Going forward, this will be the case with all the resettable sound zero-knowledge arguments in our protocol Σ.
3. For = 1, . . . k:
The random tape required by S to generate the above challenge bits comes from G(msg).
S → U:
Since the underlying protocol Π is secure only against semi-honest adversaries, the random coins used by each party are required to be unbiased. Hence S generates r 2 $ ← R (using the random tape from G(msg)) and sends it to U. Define r 2 = r 2 ⊕ r 2 . Now r 2 is the randomness which will be used by U for carrying out the protocol Π (among other things).
Smartcard Input Commitment Phase
1. S → U: Generate a string r 1 $ ← R and let α = (x 1 , r 1 ). Commit to α using the commitment scheme COM and denote the commitment string by A. The random tape required to generate the string r 1 and to compute the commitment A comes from G(msg).
S ↔ U:
Now S has to give a proof of knowledge of the opening of the commitment A to U. In other words, S has to prove that it knows a valueα = (x 1 ,r 1 ) such that the commitment A can be decommitted toα. This proof is given as follows. S and U use an ordinary computational zeroknowledge proof of knowledge system (P pok , V pok ) (see Section A.2) where S and U emulates the prover P pok (proving the above statement) and the verifier V pok respectively. However the random tape used by U to emulate the verifier V pok is required to come from r 2 . To achieve this, the interaction proceeds as follows. Let t pok be the number of rounds in (P pok , V pok ) where a round is defined to have a message from P pok to V pok followed by a reply from V pok to P pok . For j = 1, . . . t pok :
• S → U: S sends the next prover message computed as per the system (P pok , V pok ). The random tape used by S to emulate P pok comes from G(msg).
• U → S: U sends the next verifier message computed as per the system (P pok , V pok ) using randomness r 2 .
• U ↔ S: U and S now execute a resettable-sound zero-knowledge argument where U emulates the prover rsP and proves the following statement to rsV emulated by S: the PRS commit phase has a major decommitmentβ = (x 2 ,r 2 ) such that the sent verifier message is consistent with the randomnessr 2 ⊕ r 2 (where r 2 was as sent by S in the PRS preamble phase).
The above system can be seen as a resettable zero-knowledge argument of knowledge system [BGGL01] . However when used in our context as above, the simulator of this system will be straightline.
3. U → S: U generates r 1 $ ← R using the random tape r 2 and sends it to S. Define r 1 = r 1 ⊕ r 1 . Now r 1 is the randomness which will be used by S for carrying out the protocol Π.
4. U ↔ S: U and S now execute a resettable-sound zero-knowledge argument. U emulates the prover rsP and proves the following statement to rsV emulated by S: the PRS commit phase has a major decommitment (see Section A.5)β = (x 2 ,r 2 ) such that message r 1 is consistent with the randomnessr 2 ⊕ r 2 .
Secure Computation Phase
Let the underlying protocol Π have t rounds 1 where one round is defined to have a message from S to U followed by a reply from U to S. Let transcript T j 1 (resp. T j 2 ) be defined to contain all the messages exchanged between S and U before the point party S (resp. U) is supposed to send a message in round j. Now, each message sent by either party in the protocol Π is compiled into a message block in Σ. For j = 1, . . . t:
1. S → U: S sends the next message m j 1 (= Π(T j 1 , x 1 , r 1 )) as per the protocol Π. Now S has to prove to U that the sent message m j 1 was honestly generated using input x 1 and randomness r 1 . In other words, S has to prove the following statement: there exist a valueα = (x 1 ,r 1 ) such that: (a) the message m j 1 is consistent with the inputx 1 and the randomnessr 1 ⊕r 1 (i.e., m This proof is given as follows. S and U use an ordinary computational zero-knowledge proof system (P, V ) (see Section A.2) where S and U emulates the prover P (proving the above statement) and the verifier V respectively. However the random tape used by U to emulate the verifier V is required to come from r 2 . To achieve this, the interaction proceeds as follows. Let t be the number of rounds in (P, V ) where a round is defined to have a message from P to V followed by a reply from V to P . For j = 1, . . . t :
• S → U: S sends the next prover message computed as per the system (P, V ). The random tape used by S to emulate P comes from G(msg).
• U → S: U sends the next verifier message computed as per the system (P, V ) using randomness r 2 .
• U ↔ S: U and S now execute a resettable-sound zero-knowledge argument where U emulates the prover rsP and proves the following statement to rsV emulated by S: the PRS commit phase has a major decommitmentβ = (x 2 ,r 2 ) such that the sent verifier message is consistent with the randomnessr 2 ⊕ r 2 .
To summarize, the random tape used by U to emulate the verifier V is required to be committed in advance. However S is free to use any random tape while emulating the prover P (although in the interest of its own security, S is instructed to use randomness from G(msg).
2. U sends the next message m j 2 (= Π(T j 2 , x 2 , r 2 )) as per the protocol Π. U and S now execute a resettable-sound zero-knowledge argument where U emulates the prover rsP and proves to S that m j 2 was honestly generated using input x 2 and randomness r 2 . More precisely, U proves the following statement: the PRS commit phase has a major decommitmentβ = (x 2 ,r 2 ) such that m j 2 is consistent with the inputx 2 and the randomnessr 2 ⊕ r 2 .
This completes the description of the protocol Σ. The usage of randomness in the above protocol can be summarized as follows. After sending the very first message (i.e., the determining message msg), the only fresh randomness that can be used by the user U is while emulating the prover rsP of resettable sound zero-knowledge arguments. The smartcard S is essentially "free" to use any randomness it wants (except while computing messages of the underlying protocol Π). An honest S always sets its random tape to G(msg) to carry out the protocol Σ .
At the end of above protocol Σ, both the parties will hold the desired output. We stress that we require only standard (standalone) semi-honest security from the underlying protocol Π. Thus, when we set the underlying protocol Π to be the constant round two-party computation protocol of Yao [Yao86], the resulting protocol Σ has k (= ω(log κ)) rounds. To obtain a constant round protocol, the first step would be the construction of a concurrent zero-knowledge argument system in a constant number of rounds. We also remark that the above resettable two-party computation also implies (under standard assumptions) resettable multi-party computation (where only one of the parties can be reset) with dishonest majority. The construction for resettable multi-party computation can be obtained using standard techniques from the two-party one (i.e., the n − 1 "non-resettable" parties will use a regular multi-party computation protocol [GMW87] among them to emulate a single party holding n − 1 inputs).
In appendix C, we prove that the protocol Σ is a resettable two-party computation protocol by proving the following two theorems.
Theorem 1 (Security Against a Malicious U * ) The compiled protocol Σ is secure against a malicious U * as per the definition in Section 2.1.
Theorem 2 (Security Against a Malicious S * ) The compiled protocol Σ is secure against a malicious S * in the sense of the definition in Section 2.1.
Simultaneous Resettable Multi-Party Computation with Honest Majority
The Construction
We now describe how to transform any given protocol Π (which is only semi-honest secure) into a simultaneous resettably secure protocol Σ with honest majority. We assume n parties P 1 , . . . , P n where a majority of the parties behave honestly. All the parties are "resettable", or in other words, the adversarial parties can reset any number of honest parties at any time during the protocol execution. We assume that before the protocol starts, the parties have agreed upon which incarnation will be used by which party. The private inputs of parties P 1 , . . . , P n are denoted by x 1 , . . . , x n respectively. Let R denote the uniform distribution. The protocol Σ proceeds as follows.
Input Commitment Phase
Each party P i does the following computations. Any randomness required for these computations comes from the random tape of (appropriate incarnation of) P i which is potentially reusable in other sessions.
• Generate a function G i : {0, 1} ≤poly(κ) → {0, 1} poly(κ) randomly from an ensemble of pseudorandom functions and let α i = (x i , G i ). Compute a commitment to α i using the commitment scheme COM and denote it by A i .
• Generate the first verifier message Z i ← f zaps (κ) of a zap system (see Section A.3).
• Generate a pair (P K i , SK i ) of public and secret keys using the key generation algorithm of a semantically secure public key encryption system having perfect completeness.
• Generate n strings a 1 i , . . . , a n i from the domain of a one way function F . For all j, compute b
Additionally, we assume that a party P i has a random tape R i,zkv which it uses for the verification of messages of a 1 round ZKAOK system as we explain later on. P i now broadcasts the values
The string msg i is called the determining message of party P i for this session. Note that since a party P i may have to reuse its random tape, the determining message msg i may be identical across various protocol executions.
The random tape used by P i to carry out rest of the protocol Σ (except for the verification of the messages of the 1 round ZKAOK system) will be determined by the application of the pseudorandom function G i to the (concatenation of) determining messages of all other parties. That is, denote R i = G i (msg 1 || . . . ||msg i−1 ||msg i+1 || . . . ||msg n ). Now R i serves as the random tape of P i for the rest of the protocol. We assume that R i is of sufficient size to allow the execution of all the steps.
Construction of a 1-round zero-knowledge argument of knowledge. We now describe the construction of a family of 1-round zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAOK) systems. The (i, j)th argument system is used by party P i to prove statements to party P j . Additionally, the argument systems (i, j) and (k, ), where i = k, are simulation sound w.r.t. each other. To prove a statement x ∈ L to party P j , a party P i holding the witness w (for the given witness relation) proceeds as follows:
• P i breaks the witness w into n shares w 1 , . . . , w n using the Shamir threshold secret sharing scheme
[Sha79] such that a majority of the shares are sufficient to reconstruct the witness w. For all k, P i encrypts w k under the public key P K k . Let the ciphertext be denoted by C k . P i now broadcasts all the n ciphertexts so generated.
• P i finally generates and sends the prover message of the zap system (acting on the verifier message Z j ) proving that one of the following statements is true:
1. The ciphertexts C 1 , . . . , C n represent the encryption of shares of a valid witness. More precisely, there exists stringsŵ 1 , . . . ,ŵ n such that: (a) for all k, C k is a valid encryption ofŵ k , and, (b)ŵ 1 , . . . ,ŵ n are valid shares of a single stringŵ as per the Shamir secret sharing scheme, and, (c)ŵ is a valid witness for the witness relation (i.e., x ∈ L).
2. The ciphertexts C 1 , . . . , C n represent the encryption of shares of a majority of preimages of the strings b i 1 , . . . , b i n under the one way function F . More precisely, there exists stringsŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ n such that: (a) for all k, C k is a valid encryption ofŝ k , and, (b)ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ n are valid shares of a single stringŝ as per the Shamir secret sharing scheme, and, (c)ŝ = (â 1 i , . . . ,â n i ) and there exists a set S maj of indices such that |S maj | > n/2 and for all ∈ S maj , b i = F (â i ).
Thus, we have a trapdoor condition which allows a party P i to give a simulated argument using the preimages of b i 1 , . . . , b i n . Note that the "trapdoor" for each party is "independent". That is, informally speaking, even given the preimages of strings b i 1 , . . . , b i n , a party P j with j = i will be unable to give a simulated argument.
Coin Flipping Phase
Since the underlying protocol Π is secure only against semi-honest adversaries, the random coins used by each party in Π are required to be unbiased. Hence the parties run a 2 round coin flipping phase to generate a long unbiased public random string as given below. As noted before, the random tape that a party P i uses to execute this stage (i.e., generate of random strings, commitment and messages of the 1-round ZKAOK system) comes from R i . However the random tape (if needed) used by P i to verify the messages of the ZKAOK system comes from R i,zkv .
• In the first round, each party P i generates R i $ ← R and broadcasts a commitment B i to R i using the commitment scheme COM. For all j = i, party P i additionally broadcasts a ZKAOK (using the (i, j)th 1-round ZKAOK system) proving that the commitment B i was correctly computed using randomness R i . More precisely, P i proves that there exists a stringα i = (x i ,Ĝ i ) such that: (a) the commitment A i can be decommitted toα i , and, (b) the commitment B i to a random string (and the random string itself) was computed using randomnessĜ i (msg 1 || . . . ||msg i−1 ||msg i+1 || . . . ||msg n ). Note that this ZKAOK is given for a specific witness relation such that the witness allows extraction of such aα i .
• In the second round, each party P i broadcasts the committed string R i (without providing any decommitment information). For all j = i, party P i additionally broadcasts a ZKAOK (using the (i, j)th 1-round ZKAOK system) proving that the commitment B i can be decommitted to the string R i . Denote r 1 || . . . ||r n = R 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ R n . At this point, the strings r 1 , . . . , r n are all guaranteed to be random.
Each P i further privately generates a random r i . Define r i = r i ⊕ r i . Now r i is the randomness that will be used by party P i to carry out the underlying protocol Π in the next stage.
Secure Computation Phase
Let the underlying protocol Π have t rounds 2 where any number of parties can send a message in any given round. Let transcript T j be defined to contain all the messages broadcast before the round j. Now, for j = 1, . . . t: 2. For all k = i, party P i additionally broadcasts a ZKAOK (using the (i, k)th 1-round ZKAOK system) proving that the sent message m j i was honestly generated using input x i and randomness r i . In other words, P i proves the following statement: there exist a valueα i = (x i ,Ĝ i ) such that: (a) the message m j i is consistent with the inputx i and the randomnessr i ⊕ r i (i.e., m j i = Π(T j ,x i ,r i ⊕ r i )) wherer i is generated fromĜ i , and, (b) commitment A i can be decommitted toα i . As before, the random tape used by P i for generation and verification of the messages of ZKAOK system comes from R i and R i,zkv respectively. This completes the description of the protocol Σ. The usage of randomness in the above protocol can be summarized as follows. After sending the very first message (i.e., the determining message msg i ), the only fresh and uncommitted random tape that can potentially be used by a malicious party P i is for the generation and verification of the 1-round ZKAOK messages (although the honest parties are instructed to use the committed random tape for the generation of 1-round ZKAOK messages).
Applying the above transformation to the constant round protocol of Beaver et al [BMR90] , we obtain a constant round protocol Σ (secure against a minority of malicious parties). Our protocol is based on computational assumptions; the existence of NIZK (or equivalently, two round zaps [DN00] ) to be precise. We note that it is easy to rule out information theoretically secure protocols in our setting very similar to how Barak et al [BGGL01] ruled out resettably-sound zero-knowledge proofs. The basic idea is that since an honest party has only a bounded size secret information (i.e., the input and the random tape), an unbounded dishonest party can interact with it several times (by resetting it each time) so as to "almost" learn its input/output behavior (and hence an honest party input "consistent" with that behavior). More details will be provided in the full version.
Let M be the list of malicious parties. Denote the list of honest parties H = {P 1 , . . . , P n } − M. We prove the following theorem in appendix D, Theorem 3 (Security Against a Minority of Malicious Parties) The compiled protocol Σ is secure as per definition 2.2 against the coalition of malicious parties represented by M as long as |M| < n/2.
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A Building Blocks
A.1 Non-interactive Perfectly Binding Commitment Scheme with a Unique Decommitment
In our protocol, we shall use a non-interactive perfectly binding commitment scheme with the properties that every commitment has a unique decommitment and the verification of the decommitment is deterministic. An example of such a scheme is the scheme that commits to the bit b by com(b; (r, x)) = r||π(x)||(x · r) ⊕ b where π is a one-way permutation on the domain {0, 1} k , x · y denotes the inner-product of x and y over GF (2), and x, r ← U k . We denote this commitment scheme by COM.
A.2 Computational Zero-knowledge Proofs and Proofs of Knowledge for all of NP
We shall use a computational zero-knowledge proof (ZK proof) for every language in NP with negligible soundness error and perfect completeness. Such proof systems can be constructed out of any one way function. One way to construct them is to create statistically binding commitments based on a OWF [HILL99, Nao91] . These commitments can then be used in the 3-colorability protocol of [GMW91] to give us a ZK proof for any language in NP. We can then repeat the protocol κ 2 times to achieve negligible soundness error. The protocol obtained will also have perfect completeness. Note that it is also possible to obtain constant round protocols using techniques based on parallel repetitions [GK96] (assuming collision resistant hash functions). We denote the final protocol with negligible soundness error as (P, V ). We will also need a (computational) ZK proof of knowledge protocol for all of NP which can be constructed using similar techniques. We denote the ZK proof of knowledge protocol by (P pok , V pok ).
A.3 Two Round Zaps
Zaps are two round public coin witness indistinguishable proofs introduced by Dwork and Naor [DN00] . Zaps further have the special property that the first message (sent by the prover) can be reused for multiple proofs. We denote an algorithm for sampling the first message (of the verifier) by f zaps (κ).
A.4 Resettable Sound Zero-Knowledge Arguments
Resettable sound zero-knowledge (rsZK) arguments were introduced by Barak et al [BGGL01] . As in resettable zero-knowledge [CGGM00] , rsZK arguments deal with the zero-knowledge functionality but consider the setting when the verifier is resettable by the prover. Barak et al [BGGL01] gave a construction of rsZK arguments relying on the non-black techniques introduced by Barak [Bar01] . They also ruled out rsZK arguments having a black-box simulator (except for languages in BPP) thus showing that usage of non-black box techniques is inherent. In our constructions, we rely crucially on the fact that rsZK arguments (as defined by [BGGL01] ) have the property that soundness holds even if the verifier can use the same random string in multiple zero-knowledge argument executions even for different statements. We denote such an rsZK argument system by (rsP, rsV ).
A.5 Preamble from PRS [PRS02]
In this subsection, we describe the preamble from [PRS02] and give its useful properties for our context. We note that [RK99, KP01] also have similar preambles which could be used for our purpose (although with an increase in the number of rounds). The preamble of the PRS protocol is as follows. Let κ be the security parameter of the system and k be any super-logarithmic function in κ. Let α be the bit string we wish to commit to and γ be length of α. We break α up into two random shares k 2 times. Let these shares be denoted by {α 0 i, } k i, =1 and {α 1 i, } k i, =1 with α 0 i, ⊕ α 1 i, = r for every i, . The verifier will commit to these bits using a statistically binding commitment scheme COM, with fresh randomness each time. 3 The verifier then sends these k 2 commitments to the prover. This is then followed by k iterations where in the th iteration, the prover sends a random k-bit string b = b 1, , . . . , b k, , and the verifier decommits to the commitments COM(α
The goal of this protocol is to enable the simulator to be able to rewind and find the value α with high probability by following a fixed strategy. Since the verifier commitments are set after the first round, once we rewind the verifier, the simulator will have the opportunity to have the verifier open both the α 0 commitment and the α 1 commitment. In the concurrent setting, rewinding a protocol can be difficult since one may rewind past the start of some other protocol in the system as observed by [DNS98] . The remarkable property of this protocol is that there is a fixed rewinding strategy the simulator can use to get the value of α, for every concurrent cheating verifier strategy V * , with high probability.
We will follow [MOSV06] in formalizing the properties of the PRS preamble we need. Without loss of generality, assume that there are Q concurrent sessions. Recall that k is the number of rounds of the PRS preamble.
We call the simulator for the PRS preamble CEC-Sim. CEC stands for concurrently-extractable commitments. CEC-Sim will have oracle access to V * and will get the following inputs.
• Commitments schemes COM = COM 1 , COM 2 , . . . , COM Q , where COM s is the commitment scheme used for session s.
• Parameters γ, k, n and Q, all given in unary.
We also need the following definitions adapted from [MOSV06] :
Definition 2 (Major Decommitment) A major decommitment is a reveal after the PRS preamble in which V * reveals the opening of commitments {COM(σ 0 i, )} k i, =1 and {COM(σ 1 i, )} k i, =1 . The prover P only accepts the major decommitment if: (a) all these openings are valid openings to the commitments in the transcript, and, (b) there exists σ such that for all i, , Observe that if a message M =(σ, σ 0 i,j , σ 1 i,j ) is compatible with the transcript T [s], the cheating verifier can major-decommit to a message different from σ only with probability at most b com . Thus we call σ the extracted message.
Definition 5 A Simulator CEC − Sim V * has the concurrent extraction property if for every interaction T it has with V * , it also provides (on a separate output tape) an array of messages (M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M Q ) with the following property: For every session s ∈ {1, 2, . .
. , Q}, if T [s] is a valid commit phase transcript, then M s is compatible with T [s].
A simulator that has the concurrently extractable property is also called a concurrently-extractable simulator.
Using the simulation and rewinding techniques in [PRS02] , we can obtain a concurrently-extractable simulator for the PRS preamble. Let P, V * denote the output of V * after concurrently interacting with P.
Lemma 1 (implicit in [PRS02] , adapted from [MOSV06] ). There exists a PPT concurrently-extractable simulator CEC-Sim with a fixed strategy SIMULATE such that for COM and all concurrent adversaries V * , for settings of parameters σ=poly(n), k =Õ(log n), and Q =poly(n), we have the ensembles
have statistical difference , where is negligible.
B Simultaneous Resettable Multi-Party Computation Model
We consider a system of n parties P 1 , . . . , P n who interact with each other trying to compute a joint function of their inputs. Each party could have various incarnations where the ith incarnation of a party P j is defined by the input and random tape tuple (x i j , ω i j ). We denote by X i the full input and random tape vector of P i and let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ). Before the protocol begins, we assume that all parties have agreed upon which incarnation will be used by which party. We consider an adversary A controlling a minority of parties. At any point during the protocol execution, A can reset any number of honest parties.
As in the two party case, we formalize the above requirement by defining an ideal and a real model. We consider static adversaries (corrupting a minority of the parties) and computational security. We do not consider the issue of output delivery and only guarantee security with abort. This is because the adversary is anyway allowed to reset the honest parties (which in particular means that even after the protocol execution is complete, he can reset the honest parties back to their initial state). For the simplicity of exposition, we assume that all the n parties in the protocol share a broadcast channel among them. Since we do not consider the issue of output delivery, such a broadcast channel can actually be implemented by secure point to point channels (which in turn can be implemented, e.g., by shared keys or a PKI) in case of honest majority. See [GL02] for more discussions on this issue.
Ideal model. In the ideal model there is a trusted party which computes the desired functionality based on the inputs handed to it by the players. Let M ⊂ {P 1 , . . . , P n } denote the set of players malicious by the adversary. Then an execution in the ideal model proceeds as follows:
Select incarnation The adversary A sends an index vector to the trusted party specifying the incarnation for each of the honest parties. The trusted party passes on this information to the honest parties.
Inputs Each party P i has input x i . We represent the vector of inputs by x.
Send inputs to trusted party Honest parties always send their inputs to the trusted party. Corrupted parties, on the other hand, may decide to send modified values to the trusted party.
Trusted party computes the result The trusted party sets the result to be f ( x).
Trusted party sends results to adversary The trusted party sends the result f ( x) to party P i for all P i ∈ M.
Trusted party sends results to honest players The adversary, depending on its view up to this point, prepares a (possibly empty) list of honest parties which should get the output. The trusted party sends the result to the parties in that list and sends ⊥ to others.
Reset ideal world at any point The adversary A, during the execution of any of the above steps, can send the signal reset to the trusted party. In that case, the trust party sends reset to all the honest parties and the ideal world comes back to the select incarnation stage.
Outputs An honest party P i always outputs the response it received from the trusted party. Malicious parties output ⊥, by convention. The adversary outputs an arbitrary function of its entire view (which includes the view of all malicious parties) throughout the execution of the protocol.
For a given adversary A, the execution of f in the ideal model on X is defined as the output of the honest parties along with the output of the adversary resulting from the process above. It is denoted by ideal f,A ( X).
Real model. Honest parties follow all instructions of the prescribed protocol, while malicious parties are coordinated by a single adversary and may behave arbitrarily. The adversary can reset any number of honest parties at any point during the protocol execution. After getting reset, an honest party comes back to its original state. At the conclusion of the protocol, honest parties compute their output as prescribed by the protocol, while the malicious parties output ⊥. Without loss of generality, we assume the adversary outputs exactly its entire view of the execution of the protocol.
For a given adversary B and protocol Σ for resettably computing f , the execution of Σ in the real model on X (denoted real Σ,B ( X) is defined as the output of the honest parties along with the output of the adversary resulting from the above process.
Having defined these models, we now define what is meant by a secure protocol.
Definition 6 Let f and Σ be as above. Protocol Σ is a t-secure protocol for computing (f, g) if for every ppt adversary A corrupting at most t players in the real model, there exists an eppt adversary S corrupting those t players in the ideal model, such that:
C Security Analysis of the Resettable Two-Party Computation Protocol
Proof. Given S Π , the simulator for the underlying protocol Π, we show how to construct a simulator Sim 1 for the protocol Σ. Sim 1 will interact with the adversary U * (on behalf of S) and simulate its view. Sim 1 will output a simulated transcript from a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the transcript of a real interaction. The simulator Sim 1 is described below.
Description of the Simulator Sim 1 . The simulator Sim 1 consists of two parts: a wrapper S wrap and a core simulator S core . S wrap acts as a "wrapper" around the malicious U * and handles all its communication as well as reset requests. S wrap in turn communicates with the core simulator S core but is not allowed to reset S core . Very informally, the function of S wrap is to convert a reset attack into a concurrent attack. We first describe the operation of S wrap in detail.
The Wrapper S wrap . The wrapper S wrap runs the malicious U * and interacts with it. S wrap in turn interacts with S core in several sessions concurrently and, very roughly, forwards it all the messages received from U * except the messages of the resettable sound zero-knowledge (rsZK) argument (and except certain "duplicate messages" as explained later). First we define the user tuple for a session as the set of the determining message (see section 4.1) for that session and the incarnation index of the smartcard S which U * requested to be activated for the session. Now the number of concurrent sessions between S wrap and S core is equal to the total number of unique user tuples that S wrap ever receives from U * . In more detail, these interactions take place as follows.
• The first message msg that S wrap receives from U * (after U * requested a particular incarnation e of S to be activated) is the determining message of the session. Now there are two possibilities:
1. S wrap has received the user tuple (msg, e) for the first time from U * for this particular incarnation. In this case, S wrap opens a new session with S core specifying the incarnation e (however S wrap doesn't yet send any messages in that session). Each concurrent session of S wrap with S core is indexed by its user tuple (msg, e).
2. S wrap received the same user tuple (msg, e) in a session earlier from U * (before S wrap was reset by U * ). This means that a session with index (msg, e) is already in progress between S wrap and S core . Hence S wrap does nothing in this case. Going forward, for session (msg, e), we categorize every message (which is not a message of the rsZK argument system) received from U * as either a duplicate message or an original message. A duplicate message means that the corresponding message for session (msg, e) was already forwarded to S core earlier. This in turn means that the same message was received earlier from U * and was successfully authenticated (i.e., an obvious cheating attempt was not detected and its associated rsZK argument, if any, was completed successfully).
• The wrapper S wrap and U * now execute a resettable sound ZK argument as usual where U * proves to S wrap that msg represents a valid PRS commit phase. For all e, S wrap has a fixed random string R e rs which it uses when acting as a verifier for all the rsZK arguments for sessions where incarnation e was activated. After successful completion of this rsZK argument, if msg is an original message (i.e., was not already forwarded to S core ) S wrap forwards it to S core . Else, msg is discarded as a duplicate message.
• During the PRS preamble challenge response phase, S wrap does the following for = 1, . . . k.
1. If the previous message received from U * was a duplicate message, S wrap already had the challenge bits b 1, , . . . , b k, $ ← {0, 1} k stored. Else S wrap received them from S core on forwarding it the previous message. Thus, S wrap forwards these challenge bits to U * .
2. S wrap receives the response from U * and checks if all the decommitments are valid. If so, it forwards the response to S core if it is an original message (and does nothing otherwise).
• For rest of the protocol (i.e., during the smartcard input commitment and secure computation phases), S wrap behaves as follows.
1. If the previous message received from U * was a duplicate message, S wrap already had the next message to be forwarded to it. Else S wrap received it from S core on forwarding it the previous message. Thus, S wrap forwards the next message to U * .
2. S wrap receives the response from U * and then, as usual, executes a resettable sound ZK argument with U * to ensure the correctness of the received message. After successful completion of the rsZK argument, if the received message is an original message, S wrap forwards it to S core (and does nothing otherwise).
During the execution of the above protocol, whenever S wrap receives a reset request from U * , it treats it as a "session on hold" request. That is, S wrap just stops the execution of the current session with S core and switches to the execution of another session (depending on the user tuple received from U * after the reset request).
If at any point, S wrap receives a message from U * such that it is successfully authenticated and a corresponding message different from this message was already forwarded to S core earlier, S wrap aborts. S wrap also aborts anytime an obvious cheating attempt is detected from U * .
At the end of the interaction between S wrap and U * , if U * aborts (without completing the last session), S wrap sends the signal abort to S core . In this case, the honest smartcard S would get ⊥ as its output in the ideal world. Else, S wrap sends the signal finish to S core along with the user tuple (msg f inal , e f inal ) of the last finished session.
The Core Simulator S core . Simulator S core accepts interaction in various concurrent sessions from S wrap . The strategy of S core is as follows.
• In the PRS preamble phase, S core uses the PRS simulator [PRS02] to extract the values committed to in each of sessions as follows. The wrapper S wrap interacts concurrently with S core in several concurrent sessions. S core runs the concurrently extractable simulator CEC-Sim (see Section A.5) and recovers a value β[i] compatible (see definition 4) with the PRS commit phase transcript of session i. CEC-Sim works by creating various look ahead threads (see [PRS02] ) in addition to the main thread of interaction with S wrap . If CEC-Sim fails (and outputs ⊥), the core simulator S core simply aborts and outputs ⊥. The strategy of S core in the rest of the phases (for the main as well the look ahead threads) is described later.
Now since the PRS commit phase of each of the session is guaranteed to be a valid commit phase (by the soundness of the rsZK arguments accepted by S wrap ), we have that
is the major decommitment of the PRS commit phase of session i. That is, S core has extracted the input x 2 [i] and all the randomness r 2 [i] to be used by S wrap in the execution of the rest of the protocol in the ith session.
• In each (i.e., main as well as look ahead) of the threads, for session i, S core now uses the simulator S Π of the protocol Π (secure only against semi-honest adversaries) to generate a protocol transcript. The simulator S Π is run on the extracted input x 2 [i] (for this particular thread). S Π starts executing and, at some point, makes a call to the trusted party (in the ideal world) with some input x 2 [i]. S core forwards this call to the actual ideal world trusted party (recall that S core is interacting on behalf of the honest S in the protocol Σ) specifying the appropriate incarnation of S and then passes on the response to S Π . However in the ideal world, instead of signaling the trusted party to send the output to the honest S as well, S core sends the reset signal to the trusted party (hence allowing itself to make multiple queries for completing various sessions and various threads). Finally, S Π halts and outputs a transcript m 1 • In each of the threads, for session i, S core generates a random α[i] = (x 1 [i], r 1 [i]) and completes the smartcard input commitment phase honestly using it.
• In each of the threads, the core simulator S core runs the secure computation phase as follows. For session i, the goal of S core now is to force the transcript m 1
onto the wrapper S wrap (and hence onto U * ). This is done as follows. In round j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, S core sends the message m j 1 [i] to S core (instead of sending a message as per the input and randomness committed to in the smartcard input commitment phase earlier). Now S core is required to give a zero-knowledge proof that m j 1 [i] was computed correctly. However S core has already extracted the randomness r 2 [i] which S wrap will use while acting as a verifier of this proof. Hence, S core can generate a simulated transcript for the proof offline and then force it onto S wrap using techniques similar to those being used to force the transcript of protocol Π. After completion of the zero-knowledge proof, S wrap forwards its reply to S core . Clearly, the reply of S wrap has to be the message m j 2 [i] with all but negligible probability (by the soundness of the rsZK argument which S wrap accepted from U * ).
• The core simulator S core , having finished all the sessions with S wrap , now looks at the final message received from S wrap . If S wrap sent the abort signal, S core sends abort to the trusted party in the ideal world, thus causing the output of S to be ⊥. Otherwise, S core looks at the received session index i = msg f inal and retrieves the query x 2 [i] made by the simulator S Π while generating the protocol transcript for the session i during the main thread. S core now requests the smartcard incarnation e f inal to be activated in the ideal world and sends input x 2 [i] to the trusted party.
After getting the output, it instructs the trusted party to send the output also to S thus completing the ideal world execution.
This completes the description of the simulator Sim 1 .
Indistinguishability of the Real and Simulated Views. We will consider a series of hybrid experiments and show that the successive hybrids are indistinguishable from each other. Our initial experiment will be the actual protocol as executed by U * and S. Our final experiment will be the simulated protocol as described above. Below, we only give a sketch of our hybrid experiments.
Experiment H 0 . This experiment corresponds to when the simulator Sim 1 has the required input and randomness vector X 1 (i.e., x e 1 and (G e , R e rs ) for incarnation e) and runs the protocol honestly with the malicious user U * .
Experiment H 1 . In this experiment, the simulator Sim 1 is broken into a core simulator S core (having input x e 1 and G e for all e) and a wrapper S wrap (having input R e rs for all e). The wrapper S wrap behaves as described above (see the description of the simulator Sim 1 ). However the core simulator S core handles the concurrent sessions honestly and computes all its replie.s using x e 1 and G e as per the protocol specifications. The only difference between H 0 and H 1 is that now the interaction with U * is aborted if at any point, S wrap receives a message from U * such that it is successfully authenticated and a corresponding message different from this message was already forwarded to S core earlier. By the soundness of the rsZK arguments (see Section A.4), it can be shown that the probability of this event happening is negligible. Thus, we have that the view of U * in experiment H 1 is indistinguishable from the view in H 0 .
Experiment H 2 . This experiment is defined exactly as the previous one with the exception that now S core discards the input G e for all e and instead uses freshly generated random tape in all the concurrent sessions. Consider incarnation e. Assuming there were concurrent sessions with (distinct) determining messages msg 1 , . . . , msg , we are essentially replacing the string G e (msg 1 ), . . . , G e (msg ) with a uniformly chosen string. Both the strings are computationally indistinguishable by the property of the pseudorandom function G e . Thus, we have that the view of U * in experiment H 2 is indistinguishable from the view in H 1 .
Experiment H 3 . This experiment is defined exactly as the previous one with the exception that now S core uses the concurrently extracting simulator CEC-Sim to extract the values committed to by S wrap in the PRS commit phase in each of sessions as explained before. Thus for each of the threads, for session i, S core has the committed value
. After finishing the PRS commit phase, for each of the sessions, S core runs the rest of the protocol as in Experiment H 2 (in the main as well as the look ahead threads). Note that if CEC-Sim fails (and outputs ⊥), S core simply aborts. Lemma 1 states that the view of U * in this experiment (with simulated PRS commit phase) remains indistinguishable from the one in experiment H 2 .
Experiment H 4 . This experiment is defined exactly as the previous one with the exception that now the simulator S core starts simulating the ZKPOK being given in the smartcard input commitment phase (in all the sessions of all the threads). S core uses the simulator S pok of the system (P pok , V pok and generates a simulated transcript offline (since it has already extracted the randomness of the verifier S wrap ). S core then forces this simulated transcript onto S wrap . By the zero-knowledge property of the proof system (P pok , V pok (and security of the rsZK argument system), it follows that the view of U * in experiment H 4 is indistinguishable from the view in H 3 .
Experiment H 5 . This experiment is defined exactly as the previous one with the exception that now in each of the threads, for session i, the simulator S core generates a random α[i] = (x 1 [i], r 1 [i]) and commits to it in the smartcard input commitment phase (as opposed to committing the real input and random tape which it is using to complete the protocol). Since this commitment is not being used anywhere else in the protocol, by the computationally hiding property of the commitment scheme COM, the view of U * in experiment H 5 is indistinguishable from the view in H 4 .
Experiment H 6 . This experiment is defined exactly as the previous one with the exception that now the simulator S core starts giving a real ZKPOK of the committed α[i] in the smartcard input commitment phase (in all the sessions of all the threads) as opposed to a simulated one. Again by the zero-knowledge property of the proof system (P pok , V pok , it follows that the view of U * in experiment H 6 is indistinguishable from the view in H 5 . Note that at this point, the smartcard input commitment phase is essentially "disconnected" and independent of the rest of the protocol. However the simulator S core is still using the real input during the secure computation phase.
Experiment H 7 . In this experiment, in each of the threads, for session i, S core now uses the simulator S Π of the protocol Π to generate a protocol transcript. All the calls to the trusted party in the ideal world are made (as required by S Π ) and then a reset signal is sent by S core . Furthermore, after finishing all the interactions, S core also either sends the abort signal to the trusted party or completes the ideal world interaction with the right (final) input as appropriate. Now S Π halts and outputs a transcript 
is computed such that using r 2 [i] in rest of Σ would amount to using r Π [i] in Π. Now this experiment is defined exactly as the previous one with the exception that now the simulator S core sends the string r 2 [i] to S wrap to finish the PRS preamble phase. Clearly, the view of U * in experiment H 7 is identical to the view in H 6 . Experiment H 8 . This experiment is defined exactly as the previous one with the exception that now the simulator S core stops using the actual input during the secure computation phase and instead forces the generated m 1
[i] transcript onto S wrap . As described below (see the description of the simulator), this is done by sending the next message as usual and forcing a simulated transcript of the associated zero-knowledge proof onto S wrap . The security of the underlying protocol Π and that of the proof system (P, V ) implies that the forced transcript is indistinguishable from the real transcript. Thus it follows that the view of U * in experiment H 8 is indistinguishable from the view in H 7 .
Note that the simulator in the experiment H 8 is our actual simulator Sim 1 . Thus, the output of the simulator Sim 1 is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the transcript of a real interaction. This completes our proof.
Proof. Given S Π , the simulator for the underlying protocol Π, we show how to construct a simulator Sim 2 for the protocol Σ. Sim 2 will interact with a given incarnation of the adversary S * (on behalf of U) in a standard standalone setting and simulate its view. Sim 2 will output a simulated transcript from a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the transcript of a real interaction. The simulator Sim 2 is described below.
Description of the Simulator Sim 2 . The strategy of the simulator Sim 2 is as follows.
• Throughout the protocol Σ, whenever Sim 2 is required to participate as a prover rsP in a resettable sound zero-knowledge argument to prove a given statement, Sim 2 uses the simulator rsS of the rsZK argument system (rsP, rsV ) to give a simulated proof to the malicious smartcard S * . The simulator rsS is a non-black box straightline simulator (see Section A.4) which makes use of the code of S * and produces a view which, to S * , is computationally indistinguishable from the view when U was giving an honestly generated proof. If, for any of the proofs, the simulator rsS fails and outputs ⊥, Sim 2 aborts the whole simulation and outputs ⊥ as well.
• In the PRS preamble phase, Sim 2 generates a string β = (x 2 , r 2 ) randomly. The simulator Sim 2 then runs the PRS preamble phase honestly using β (except for the fact that Sim 2 now gives a simulated rsZK argument as noted earlier).
• In the smartcard input commitment phase, Sim 2 now uses the knowledge extractor E pok (see Section A.2) of the ZKPOK system (P pok , V pok ) to extract the string α = (x 1 , r 1 ) committed to by the smartcard S * . The extractor E pok works simply by rewinding S * (while Sim 2 continues to give simulated rsZK arguments in all the resulting threads). If the extractor E pok fails and outputs ⊥, Sim 2 aborts the whole simulation and outputs ⊥ as well.
• The simulator Sim 2 now uses the simulator S Π of the protocol Π (secure only against semi-honest adversaries) to generate a protocol transcript. The simulator S Π is run on the extracted input x 1 of the smartcard S * . S Π starts executing and, at some point, makes a call to the trusted party (in the ideal world) with some input x 1 . Sim 2 forwards this call to the actual ideal world trusted party (recall that Sim 2 is interacting on behalf of the honest U in the protocol Σ) and passes on the response to S Π . However in the ideal world, Sim 2 does not yet signal the trusted party to send the output to the honest U. Finally, S Π halts and outputs a transcript m 1 1 , m 1 2 , . . . , m t 1 , m t 2 (of the execution of protocol Π) and an associated randomness r Π .
The first task of Sim 2 now is to "force" S * to use randomness r Π during execution of the underlying protocol Π later on. To that effect, Sim 2 computes a random string r 1 such that r 1 (=r 1 ⊕ r 1 ) satisfies these requirements (i.e., using r 1 would amount to using r Π in Π). Sim 2 sends r 1 to S * (and gives a simulated rsZK argument) to finish the smartcard input commitment phase.
• The simulator Sim 2 runs the secure computation phase and forces the generated protocol transcript onto S. In round j, clearly the message sent by S * has to be m j 1 with all but negligible probability. This is because of the associated zero-knowledge proof where S * acts as the prover P and proves to Sim 2 (acting as the verifier V ) the consistency of the sent message with the committed input x 1 and random tape r 1 . Sim 2 uses a fresh random tape while emulating the verifier V (and simulates the rsZK argument associated with every verifier message). In reply to the smartcard message m j 1 , Sim 2 sends the message m j 2 from the generated protocol transcript (as opposed to sending a message using the input and random tape committed to in the PRS preamble phase) and simulates the associated rsZK argument.
• If the above simulation is completed successfully and neither party aborts, Sim 2 instructs the trusted party in the ideal world to send the output to the honest user U. Else, Sim 2 sends abort to the trusted party.
It can be shown that the above simulated transcript comes from a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the transcript of a real interaction. This is done using a sequence of hybrids similar to the ones in the proof of theorem 1. More details will be provided in the full version.
D Security Analysis of the Simultaneous Resettable Multi-Party Computation Protocol
Let M be the list of malicious parties. Denote the list of honest parties H = {P 1 , . . . , P n } − M.
Theorem 3 (Security Against a Minority of Malicious Parties) The compiled protocol Σ is secure as per definition 2.2 against the coalition of malicious parties represented by M as long as |M| < n/2.
Proof. Given S Π , the simulator for the underlying protocol Π, we show how to construct a simulator Sim for the protocol Σ. Sim will interact with the adversary A controlling parties represented by the coalition M (on behalf of the honest parties H) and simulate its view. Sim will output a simulated transcript from a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the transcript of a real interaction. The simulator Sim is described below.
Description of the Simulator Sim. As in the proof of theorem 1, the simulator Sim consists of two parts: a wrapper S wrap and a core simulator S core . S wrap acts as a "wrapper" around the adversary A and handles all its communication as well as reset requests. S wrap in turn communicates with the core simulator S core but is not allowed to reset S core . Very informally, the function of S wrap is to convert a reset attack into a concurrent attack. We first describe the operation of S wrap in detail.
The Wrapper S wrap . The wrapper S wrap runs the adversary A and interacts with it. S wrap in turn interacts with S core in several sessions concurrently and, very roughly, forwards it all the authenticated messages received from A (except certain "duplicate messages" as explained later). We first define an adversary tuple for a session as the set consisting of the determining messages of the all the malicious parties and the incarnation indices of all the honest parties which A requested to be activated for that session. Now the number of concurrent sessions between S wrap and S core is equal to the number of unique adversary tuples that S wrap ever receives from A. For the purpose of this proof, we assume w.l.g. that in a give round, first all the honest parties broadcast their messages and only then the adversarial parties broadcast their messages (i.e., we allow the adversary to be rushing).
In more detail, S wrap works as follows. In the very beginning, S wrap receives from S core the determining message for all incarnation of all honest parties. Now assume that the selection of adversary A of the incarnation of honest parties for a session be denoted by E (where E is the set consisting of incarnation indices).
• The wrapper S wrap sends to A the honest party determining message set S h consisting of appropriate determining messages as per the incarnation index set E. Further, it receives the malicious party determining message set S m . Now there are two possibilities:
1. S wrap has received the adversary tuple (S m , E) for the first time from A. In this case, S wrap opens a new session with S core specifying the incarnation index set E. Each concurrent session of S wrap with S core is indexed by its adversary tuple (S m , E). In this session, S wrap receives the honest party determining message set S h and sends the malicious party determining message set S m to S core . s 2. S wrap received the same tuple (S m , E) in a session earlier from A (before S wrap was reset by A, more on reset attacks later). This means that a session with index (S m , E) is already in progress between S wrap and S core . Hence S wrap does nothing in this case. Going forward, for session (S m , E), we categorize every message (which is not a message of the 1-round ZKAOK system) received from A as either a duplicate message or an original message. A duplicate message means that the corresponding message for session (S m , E) was already forwarded to S core earlier. This in turn means that the same message was received earlier from A and was successfully authenticated (i.e., an obvious cheating attempt was not detected and its associated 1-round ZKAOK was completed successfully).
• For rest of the protocol (i.e., during the coin flipping and secure computation phases), S wrap behaves as follows.
1. If the previous message received from A (consisting of the messages of all the malicious parties in that round) was a duplicate message, S wrap already had the next message (i.e., messages of the honest parties for the next round) to be forwarded to it. Else S wrap received it from S core on forwarding it the previous message. Thus, S wrap forwards the next message to A.
2. S wrap receives the response from A and verifies the 1-round ZKAOK messages contained in it. The randomness used by S wrap to verify the ZKAOK messages meant for the eth incarnation of party P i is R e i,zkv . After successful verification of all the ZKAOK messages thus proving correctness of the received message, if the received message is an original message, S wrap forwards it to S core . Furthermore, S wrap also forwards the ZKAOK messages (which it verified) associated with the received message. However if the received message is a duplicate message, S wrap neither forwards the received message nor the associated ZKAOK (even if the associated ZKAOK is different from the one forwarded earlier).
During the execution of the above protocol, w.l.g., we assume that S wrap only resets all the honest parties together. This is because if S wrap resets only a (strict) subset of the honest parties, the honest parties will detect that they are "out of sync" with each other (in the next round) and hence will all abort. This means that the effect of A resetting a strict subset of honest parties is the same as that when A aborts the protocol. Now whenever S wrap receives a reset request (to reset all honest parties) from A, it treats it as a "session on hold" request. That is, S wrap just stops the execution of the current session with S core and switches to the execution of another session (depending on the adversary tuple received from A after the reset request).
If at any point, S wrap receives a message from A such that it is successfully authenticated and a corresponding message different from this message was already forwarded to S core earlier, S wrap aborts. S wrap also aborts anytime an obvious cheating attempt is detected from A.
At the end of the interaction between S wrap and A, if A aborts (without completing the final session), S wrap sends the signal abort to S core . In this case, the honest parties would get ⊥ as their output in the ideal world. Else, S wrap sends the signal finish to S core along with the adversary tuple (S m,f inal , E f inal ) of the last finished session.
• For every incarnation of every honest party, S core sets the input to be a random string (of appropriate size) and computes and stores the determining message. Now for each the sessions, S core completes the input commitment phase with S wrap otherwise honestly using these determining messages. Let the determining message of party P i in the input commitment phase be A i , Z i , P K i , b 1 i , . . . , b n i .
• The first round of the coin flipping phase for each session s is executed as follows. S core sends commitments to random strings for each honest party (as opposed to computing the string using any committed random tape) to S wrap . Furthermore, for every honest party P i and every malicious party P j , S core computes a simulated 1-round ZKAOK of the correctness of the commitment and sends it to S wrap . Such a simulated proof is computed using the preimages of a majority of strings from b i 1 , . . . , b i n as the witness. Since S core decided a majority of determining messages for the session, it must have the required preimages. After receiving the malicious party messages for this
